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ABSTRACT
Supply chains need to balance competing objectives; in addition to efficiency they
need to be resilient to adversarial and environmental interference, and robust to
uncertainties in long term demand. Significant research has been conducted design-
ing efficient supply chains, and recent research has focused on resilient supply chain
design. However, the integration of resilient and robust supply chain design is less
well studied. This paper develops a method to include resilience and robustness into
supply chain design. Using the region of West Africa, which is plagued with persist-
ing logistical issues, we develop a regional risk assessment framework, then apply
categorical risk to the countries of West Africa using publicly available data. Next,
we develop a mathematical model leveraging this framework to design a resilient
supply network that minimizes cost while ensuring the network functions following
a disruption. Finally, we examine the network’s robustness to demand uncertainty
via several plausible emergency scenarios.
KEYWORDS
Network Optimization, Supply Chain Design, Resilient Networks, Robust
Networks, Scenario Analysis
1. Introduction
The Ebola outbreak and the rise of terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram and the
Islamic State in Africa have given Western Africa a recent place of prominence on the
global stage. In conjunction with this rise in global awareness, multiple agencies across
the U.S. Government–from the Center for Disease Control to the Department of State
and the Department of Defense, have increased their presence in the region. Western
Africa, encompassing 18 countries roughly the size of the continental United States,
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has become the region in Africa of highest logistical concern for the U.S. Government.
With this increased presence comes a critical need for reliable logistics support.
A key challenge facing the US, the international community and commercial com-
panies establishing operations in Africa–especially Western Africa given the number of
countries and the infrastructure condition, is the development of a robust, resilient and
efficient supply chain network. Historically, the US Government supported humanitar-
ian, military or other operations through the use of ad hoc and contingency-scheduled
missions. However, this has become costly and unreliable as the required support in
the region has increased. The absence of an efficient distribution systems hinders the
U.S. and international community’s ability to respond to humanitarian crises and help
local governments combat terrorism.
There have been recent efforts to establish such a network in West Africa, and we
examine a hub and spoke distribution network in which material originating in the
U.S. or Europe flows into a main hub on the West African coast. In addition to the
main hub, there are six transhipment nodes spread throughout the region that support
up to 53 additional potential demand locations. It is a multi-modal distribution net-
work in which product can be transported by air, ground or water. This network was
established to increase both the the efficiency and reliability of support for U.S. Gov-
ernment activity in Western Africa. However, the network’s resilience has not been
assessed, and this is of particular concern given the challenges currently facing the
region.
The research goal for this paper is to develop a resilient, robust and efficient supply
chain network for West Africa. This is achieved via the following contributions. First,
we propose a risk analysis framework to codify the risk of supply chain disruptions
associated with the region’s environmental challenges, natural barriers, and internal
conflicts. Second, we propose optimal design changes to the West Africa supply chain
to ensure the resulting network is resilient to disruption by the identified risks. Specif-
ically, we propose optimal primary and backup routes for material flow through the
network. Finally, we examine changes to the set of transshipment nodes, which induces
changes to primary and backup routes, to ensure the network’s robustness under his-
torically plausible stochastic demand scenarios.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review of types
of networks designs, along with codifying meanings for disruptions, resilience and ro-
bustness in the context of graph theory. Section 3 outlines the risk analysis framework,
and the underlying mathematical model parameters, inputs and formulation. Section
4 outlines the disruption scenarios and model variations considered, then analyzes
several model instantiations. Section 5 summarizes research findings and recommen-
dations. Section 6 concludes by summarizing research and providing future research
directions.
2. Resilient, Robust and Efficient Network Designs
Developing a supply chain for West Africa is a Supply Chain Network (SCN) design
problem, a subset of the facility location problem. (See, for instance, (Mirchandani
and Francis, 1990; Daskin, 2011) for excellent treatments of the facility location prob-
lem.) Specifically, the SCN design problem models the supply chain as a network via
graph theory (Wagner and Neshat, 2010), with nodes in the graph representing the
locations of interest (i.e., suppliers, warehouses, and or customers) and the graph’s
arcs representing the transportation routes between these locations. Numerous types
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of supply networks have been used across the Department of Defense and industry in
order to balance resilience, cost and effectiveness. We examine the pros and cons of
three of these categories: ad hoc, efficient, and resilient.
Ad hoc, or Just-in-Time (JIT), networks create nodes based on customer demand
and network necessity. These networks enable fast shipments and are reactive to
changes in customer demand, making them useful in disaster-prone situations. Ad hoc
networks are regularly utilized in supply chains, as well as in healthcare, computer,
and cellular network designs. As Golhar and Stamm (Golhar and Stamm, 1991) point
out, the basic practice of ad hoc networks is based on four major tenets. Those tenets
are: employee input in decision making, waste elimination, supplier participation, and
quality control. Employee input initiates the creation of a node. Because a node is cre-
ated per customer demand, resources needed to maintain that node are unnecessary
until the nodes implementation, i.e., waste is eliminated. Finally, supplier participation
ensures a quick response to customer demand, thus, increasing customer satisfaction
and quality control (Kannan and Tan, 2005).
A variant of JIT networks is the dynamic JIT network. Under this class of networks,
demand can change over time, between locations, and at different levels of the network
(Lai et al., 2003). Marina and Das (2001) characterize ad hoc networks as having mo-
bile hubs that develop and maintain routes as needed. They create distance vectors
for dynamic, on-demand networks using multiple path routing, leading to faster and
more efficient networks. Alkhuder (2018) completed a study on wireless sensory net-
works. His article presents methods that assist a nodes instantaneous decision making
or ad hoc function. JIT networks are reactive, fast and dynamic. Consequently, ad
hoc networks tend to be useful in disaster situations; they can still perform and send
communication in a relatively quick amount of time when unexpected mishaps occur
(Fujiwara and Watanabe, 2005). The main disadvantage of ad hoc networks comes
from their non-scalability as the network grows, oversight of employees becomes in-
creasingly difficult. Further, some JIT applications can be more expensive than those
that permanently position nodes and routes.
Another network class is efficient networks, whose goal is to obtain the most benefit
from a network while using the fewest number of permanent locations. Efficient net-
works are commonly used in warehouse assignment and location problems, in which
warehouses are optimally placed to minimize the total number of warehouses and
to possibly reduce transportation costs. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) showed that
efficient networks are either complete graphs, star graphs, or graphs with no links.
Further, Heydari et al. (2015) showed that any two nodes in an efficient network have
a maximum distance of two connections between them. If this is not the case, the
routes can be restructured to obtain a network that achieves similar or better results.
In the realm of applications, Jacyna-Go lda and Izdebski (2017) implemented a genetic
algorithm to efficiently position warehouses based on a multicriteria logistical network.
Their algorithm generated a network with efficiently placed nodes that had the same
performance as networks with more nodes.
In network design, hub-and-spoke networks are a type of efficient networks. Under
a hub-and-spoke structure, demand locations (spokes) are all connected to warehouses
(hubs). Yang et al. (2017) discuss the efficiency of this type of design in which hubs
are situated to minimize the connection length between spokes. This corresponds to
placing hubs in a centralized location, which, in turn, minimizes the number of hubs.
As such, one can conclude that the warehouse location problem and the hub-and-spoke
design problems both aim to achieve network efficiency. Although efficient networks
provide great benefit by reducing the number of components while simultaneously
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satisfying demand, such networks pose notable challenges.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) note that efficient networks are not always stable.
Jackson and Wolinksy describe stability as a networks ability to alter its connections
without damaging its function (i.e., resilient to disruption). However, in an efficient
network, removal of a link or of a node and its links could have serious ramifica-
tions, potentially sabotaging any productivity gained by using an efficient network.
This motivates the consideration of the third common type of network, a resilient net-
work. Mensah and Merkuryev (2014) and Sheffi and Rice Jr (2005) define resilience
as the networks capacity to return to its original state after disruption or to mitigate
disruption of network flow entirely. Hutchison and Sterbenz define resilience as a net-
work’s ability to maintain its service level during disruptions (Hutchison and Sterbenz,
2018). However, both of these definitions fail to explicitly define what is meant by a
’disruption’. Indeed Kim et al. (2015) note this exact problem and provide sixteen
different academic definitions for a disruption! For the purposes of this research we
utilize a graph-theoretic definition for resilience similar to that used by Kim et al.
(2015). Specifically we state that a disruption is any action (natural or man made)
that removes an arc or a node from the network. This is a rather binary definition,
as of course in the real world partial degradation is more likely, but it establishes a
conservative design.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) exemplify a tetrahedron as a stable network, as all
links are connected to one another. Thus even with removal of a arc or node the
network preserves connectivity between the nodes. Thus, networks can become more
resilient by adding nodes or more arcs. Zhalechian et al. (2018) argue that adding
resilience to their hub-and-spoke model could be achieved by connecting each node
to multiple hubs. They construct a fortified hub-and-spoke network, which resulted
in a resilient network. This network has built-in proactive and reactive capabilities,
protecting it from natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and internal network problems.
In another paper, Ng et al. (2018) address network risk management by classifying
nodes and arcs based on their geographic characteristics. Using this classification, Ng
et al. were able to mitigate the risk of network delays by assessing each node’s ease
of access as well as its suitability as a hub or spoke. Sadghiani et al. (2015) use a
set covering approach to ensure demand locations are covered by multiple suppliers
based on characteristics of the demand locations in order to increase resilience. Such
approaches focus on ensuring SCN resilience by adding routes and nodes that preserve
all locations’ ability to meet their demand. These network additions are targeted at
the location level. Such approaches are broadly aligned with the technique we present
in section 3.
Network robustness is an additional topic relevant to SCN design, but it is often
confounded with resilience. Yang et al. (2017) point out that designing a network cor-
responds to a long-term strategic decision under a dynamic and changing environment
and that due to variations in the networks geospatial inputs, a robust network could
be required rather than an efficient network. Klibi et al. (2010) define robustness as
the quality of a SCN to remain effective for all plausible futures. In general robustness
is a network’s ability to function ’well’ under a diverse set of potential future scenarios
(Snyder et al., 2006; Dong, 2006; Ben-Tal et al., 2009; Mulvey et al., 1995). The topic
of SCN robustness is still quite nascent, and to the best of our knowledge the only
other paper presenting both a resilient and scenario-based robust optimization SCN
design is (Sadghiani et al., 2015).
The supply chain proposed to serve demand in Western Africa is an efficient net-
work. However, a focus on efficiency can inhibit a network’s ability to function in
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Country Number of Nodes
Benin 1
Burkina Faso* 8
Cameroon* 5
Chad 4
Ivory Coast 1
Gabon 1
Ghana 3
Guinea 1
Liberia 1
Mali 7
Mauritania 4
Niger 3
C. African Rep. 1
Niger* 7
Nigeria 8
Senegal* 3
Sierra Leone 1
Togo 1
Table 1. Supply Chain consists of 60 total demand locations plus origin node in Europe. Countries identified
as having transshipment nodes in original architecture are indicated with a ’*’.
emergencies or disaster situations (lack of resilience), as well as hinder its ability to
function well under future scenarios with changed system parameters (lack of robust-
ness). The ability to operate under emergency and crisis situations is paramount in
humanitarian and military operations. The need for this logistics network will remain
far into the future. Our study adds elements to ensure both resilience and robust-
ness are considered in the network supporting West Africa. This research develops a
framework to identify and quantify risk in West Africa, then develops and optimizes
a mathematical model to find the best routes to ensure necessary network resilience,
and finally uses stochastic analysis of plausible demand scenarios to ensure network
robustness.
3. Risk Analysis and Model Formulation
To address the logistical challenges present in West Africa–large distances, poor infras-
tructure, insecure routes, etc., the supply chain was restructured to achieve a higher
service level and increased efficiency. The network operates under a hub-and-spoke de-
sign with a main hub, 6 transshipment nodes and 53 other potential demand locations.
Note that any of the transshipment nodes may also experience a demand.
Table 1 shows the 18 West African countries that are included in the analysis, along
with the number of potential demand nodes within each country. The European hub
serves as a dummy node, where supplies originate from this location and ship to the
main hub. The main hub of entry into West Africa, and the other six transshipment
locations, were determined by decision makers prior to the undertaking of this study.
We seek to assess and increase the network’s resilience given a set of decisions that
were made for reasons outside the scope of this analysis.
Figure 1 displays a map of the region, in which the large nodes (hubs) are trans-
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shipment facility locations and the small nodes (spokes) are demand locations.
Figure 1. Hub and spoke map of the West Africa Logistics Network. The seven large nodes are all hubs (i.e
transshipment nodes). The small nodes are spokes. The spokes are color coded to match their primary hub.
3.1. Risk Framework
The network configuration as first established does not implement any backup routes
for material flow, possibly leaving nodes inaccessible should a hub, or route, disrup-
tion occur. Granted, air routes are flexible by nature, but the long distances between
locations coupled with the delays inherent to country clearance and border issues,
necessitates a relatively fixed delivery schedule. The primary goal of this research
is to identify an optimal variant of the network which adds resiliency to disruption
while maintaining efficiency. Towards that end our model requires each location to
be connected to more than one transshipment node. However, determining ’appropri-
ate’ levels of redundancy is non-trivial as these decisions necessitate a risk analysis
framework and implementation–our first major contribution. We focus our risk anal-
ysis on three areas of interest for every country: internal conflict, infrastructure, and
terrain/climate.
Table 2 gives a short description of these three categories, along with the avail-
able scores, and the meaning of each score by category. Classifications for conflict are
determined by the U.S. Department of State travel advisory, and classifications for
infrastructure are determined by the Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book
(Central Intelligence Agency)(U.S Department of State-Bureau of Consular affairs).
Classification for Terrain/Climate was accomplished by the research team, thus pre-
senting one subjective view. However, the classifications could be adjusted based on
subject matter expertise or changing contextual conditions. Our unique approach in-
corporates the risk framework into the supply chain network design.
Table 3 presents the results for each country. In order to determine an aggregated
risk for each country we place equal weight on each of three criteria and sum the
individual scores to assess an overall risk score for each country. It should be noted
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Table 2. Resiliency risk analysis framework: Description and scores for three considered categories of internal
conflict, infrastructure, and terrain/climate.
Conflict Infrastructure Terrain/Climate
Description
Internal disputes and drug
and human trafficking
Air, land,
and sea capabilities
Disruptions relating to
natural phenomena
Score
0
Exercise normal precaution
when traveling
Ranked in Top 3rd in
World Fact Book
No Issues
1
Exercise increased caution
when traveling
Ranked in Middle 3rd in
World Fact Book
Mild Issues
2
Do not travel/reconsider
travel
Ranked in bottom 3rd in
World Fact Book
Severe Issues
that this framework does not preclude the application of non-equal weights if a subject
matter expert determines one of the three categories to be more, or less, significant
then the others.
Lastly, we compute a required resiliency level, Rc, for each country c based on
the aggregated risk score for each country. Each location is then assigned a required
resiliency level equal to its countries level. i.e., Ri=Rc. For the purposes of this research
the following step function was used to assign required resilience levels based on the
aggregated risk.
Ri =

2 if Aggregated Risk = 0 or 1
3 if Aggregated Risk = 2 or 3
4 if Aggregated Risk = 4
(1)
3.2. Mathematical Formulation
We developed an explicit mathematical formulation of the distribution network in
West Africa as a mixed integer linear program in order to determine the optimal
location for transshipment locations and route connections. To provide a precise
statement of this problem, we define:
Sets:
I : Set of locations, i ∈ I ={1, . . . , 61}.
K : Set of transportation types, k in K ={1=air, 2=land, 3=sea}.
Parameters:
C = Maximum number of spokes a transshipment node can support.
Dki,j = Distance between locations i and j using transportation type k.
Mi = Amount of material demanded at location j.
Rj = Number of connections that location j is required to have with warehouses.
S = Amount of supply material entering the main hub.
W = Number of warehouses required to open.
Decision Variables:
xi = Binary variable; equals 1 if warehouse i is open, 0 else.
yki,j = Binary variable; equals 1 if a route is established between locations i and j for
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Table 3. Resiliency risk analysis by country. Explicit risk scores are first assigned to each country by category,
score are then aggregated together, and finally a resiliency metric Rc is assigned to each country based on it’s
aggregated risk.
Country Conflict
Infra-
structure
Terrain/Climate Aggregated
Risk
RcDescription Score
Benin 0 2 0 2 3
Burkina
Faso
2 1 0 3 3
Cameroon 1 1
Volcano in
W. Africa with
fatal levels of gas
2 4 4
Central
African
Republic
2 1 0 3 3
Chad 2 1 0 3 3
Gabon 0 1 0 1 2
Ghana 0 0 0 0 2
Guinea 1 1
Monsoonal rainy
season
(June to November)
2 4 4
Guinea
Bissau
2 2 0 4 4
Ivory Cost 1 0
Possible torrential
flooding during
rainy season
1 2 3
Liberia 0 0 0 0 2
Mali 2 1 0 3 3
Mauritania 2 1 0 3 3
Niger 2 1 0 3 3
Nigeria 2 0 0 2 3
Senegal 0 1 0 1 2
Sierra
Leone
1 1
Rainfall makes it
one of the wettest
W. African coasts
1 3 3
Togo 1 1 0 2 3
transport type k, 0 else.
zki,j = Amount of material shipped from location i to j via transportation type k.
The network allows material to be delivered using three methods of transportation:
air, land, and sea. Our underlying network is assumed fully connected for all three
transportation types, with distances calculated as follows: for any two locations i,j ∈
I, we compute the actual distance Dki,j for transportation type k. If a transportation
type is infeasible between two locations, that specified route receives an input of one
million miles, ensuring the model does not select an infeasible route. Since a core
tenant of the network is a single point of entry from Europe, the initial version of the
model established as infeasible all other routes to West Africa.
Distance by air was calculated with the Euclidean distance formula, using each loca-
tion’s latitude and longitude coordinates, as determined by Google Earth. Only pairs
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of locations with airports and runways within 20 miles of each endpoint had calculated
air distances. Shared airports between two locations were precluded. Ownership of an
airport was determined by closest distance.
Ground transport distances between locations were estimated using the recom-
mended path from Google Maps and were only assigned if the route linking the pair
of locations could be traversed by land vehicles. Specifically, land transportation was
deemed unsuitable if another form of transportation was also required, e.g., both ferry
and ground transportation.
Finally, sea transportation distances were calculated using the website, Sea-
Distance.org, which provides nautical miles between ports (sea). For consistency, the
calculated nautical miles were then converted to miles. Sea distances were only com-
puted for pairs of locations with sea ports at each endpoint. We assume that there is
no capacity limit for each mode of transportation.
The problem of warehouse selection, network connections establishment, and inven-
tory distribution is formulated by the following mixed integer linear program which
we call the African Supply Chain Network Problem (ASCNP).
min
x,y,z
w1f1(z) + w2f2(y) (2)
s.t. f1(z) =
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
Dki,jz
k
i,j , (3)
f2(y) =
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
Dki,jy
k
i,j , (4)∑
i∈I/1
xi = 7, (5)∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I/1
yki,j >= Rj ∀j ∈ I, (6)∑
k∈K
∑
j∈I
yki,j <= Cxi ∀i ∈ I, (7)∑
k∈K
zk1,22 <= S, (8)∑
k∈K
zki,j <= Syi,j ∀i, j ∈ I, (9)∑
j∈I
∑
k∈K
zkj,i −
∑
j∈I
∑
k∈K
zki,j >= Mi ∀i ∈ I, (10)
x7 = 1, x12 = 1, x19 = 1, x22 = 1, x38 = 1, x46 = 1, x58 = 1, (11)
y11,22 = 1, y
2
1,22 = 0, y
3
1,22 = 1 (12)
xi ∈ {0, 1}, yki,j ∈ {0, 1}, zki,j ∈ Z ∀i, j ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K. (13)
ASCNP is structured as a weighted sum multi-objective optimization problem, other
multi-objective approaches such as the -constraint approach and the lexicographic
method (Ehrgott, 2005), were considered but not deemed appropriate. The first term
in the objective function (3) minimizes the total distance of shipped items. This can
be thought of as a proxy for minimizing the shipping costs for the primary routes in
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the network. While distance is an imperfect metric, attributing accurate costs for land,
air and sea shipments was beyond scope of this research, so material transit distance
was used as a cost proxy. The second term (4) minimizes the distance of established
routes. This term is necessary to ensure that the backup routes established for re-
siliency are not chosen arbitrarily. Constraint (5) requires the model to have a total of
seven transshipment nodes. In context of our base model, these locations are already
predetermined as seen in table 1, however variants of the ASCNP enable exploration
of more or less then these seven base hubs. Constraint (6) ensures each destination
location j ∈ I is serviced by at least Rj transshipment nodes. The number of transship-
ment node connections, Rj , required to ensure network resilience commensurate with
location risk was determined according to the methodology in section 3.1. Constraint
(7) imposes an upper bound, C, on the number of outbound connections a transship-
ment node can support (xi=1) and enforces that no connection yi,j can be established
between locations i and j unless i is a transshipment node. Our initial assumption is
that all transshipment nodes can support the same number of locations, and further
that all transshipment nodes can support the full set of locations, thus C = 60 for
our base case. Constraint (8) imposes an upper bound on the sum of flow of material
into the region and ensures it is no greater than the supply, S, provided by the source
location. Constraint (9) ensures that no material can flow between locations i and j
unless a connection is established between them (yi,j=1). Constraint (10) represents
the flow constraint at location i and ensures that the net flow of material to a location
meets it’s demand. (i.e., Total flow of material delivered to a location minus total
flow of material shipped out from that location is at least equal to its demand, Mi.)
As a result, locations can accumulate excess material, an occurrence not atypical of
real-world instances of warehouses having a surplus of material to insulate network
from demand spikes. Constraint (11) sets the seven transshipment locations to those
determined by when the original network was established, while constraint (12) estab-
lishes a main hub the point of entry to the network from Europe. Finally, the binary
and integrality constraints are enforced in Constraint (13).
Given the current assumption that each arc in the network is unconstrained, (i.e.,
that each mode of transportation can ship an unlimited quantity of materials) the
transportation type providing the shortest route between any two locations will al-
ways be selected. As a result, we could pre-process the distance parameters by first
determining the shortest distance transportation modality for all routes i, j ∈ I, then
replacing the term Dki,j in the objective function by Di,j where Di,j = mink∈K D
k
i,j and
the decision variable zki,j by zi,j . However, the model as provided enables the realistic
addition of arc capacities, and reaches optimality in seconds.
The resilience of the resulting network is ensured by requiring each location be ser-
viced by a calculated number of transshipment facilities. Identifying backup routes
early enables contract vehicles and contingency plans to be enacted. Locations with
higher risk of disruption due to conflict, infrastructure, or terrain have higher connec-
tion requirements. Hence, in the event of a network disruption, a previously identified
and established backup route could be activated, preventing demand shortages.
Figure 2 displays the network output from the default ASCNP. Since the default
model fixes the transshipment hubs predetermined locations, the main output of in-
terest is the arc map. The shaded lines indicate the primary transportation routes
for air, land, and sea respectively. The lighter lines represent the proposed backup
connections.
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Figure 2. Default network connectivity. White stars are transshipment hubs. Blue, brown and green lines
are primary routes for air, land, and sea resp.. White lines are reserve routes.
4. Scenario-based Robustness Analysis
The goal of this research is to design a resilient and robust network for West Africa
covering 60 potential demand locations. Resilience to potential network disruptions is
handled in the ASCNP model via the Ri parameter, as informed by the risk assessment
framework developed in section 3.1. However, network disruptions are not the only
risk that a supply network needs to be able to handle. Scenario-based robustness
analysis was used to assess how changing demand signals and/or capacity restrictions
resulted in changes in the network design. This was accomplished by analyzing different
demand scenarios and network modifications. These demand scenarios and network
modifications are presented below.
4.1. Scenarios Considered
Due to various instability issues in West Africa, demand at different locations is prone
to fluctuation. To account for the variation in demand, we incorporated three scenarios
based on their historical occurrences: epidemic, terrorist attack, and internal conflict.
For each of the scenarios, we assigned a probability of occurrence as well as the resulting
percentage increase in demand to account for the heightened requirement for food,
medical supplies, equipment and personnel. It should be noted that the initial demand
at each location begins at 50 units. Table 4 summarizes each demand scenario’s affected
countries, likelihood of occurring, and percentage increase in demand.
Table 4. Three crisis scenarios considered for robustness analysis along with probabilities of occurrence,
locations effected, and associated increase in regional demand to handle crisis. (www.cdc.gov, 2017; Roby)
Epidemic Terrorist Attack Internal Conflict
Likelihood 20% 50% 80%
Countries
affected
Liberia, Senegal,
Sierra Leone
Chad, Niger, Nigeria (Roby)
Burkina Faso,
Mali, Niger
Demand
increase
300% 200% 100%
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As multiple scenarios could occur simultaneously, there are eight possible combi-
nations of crisis scenarios. As determined by Table 4, it is estimated that epidemic,
terrorist attack, and internal conflict occur 20%, 50%, and 80% of the time, respec-
tively. Therefore, using Bayes Theorem we can determine the probabilities for each
possible combination of crisis. We notice that events C and BC were the most likely
to occur and thus will be discussed in more depth in our model instance analyses. The
resulting eight possible scenarios are detailed in Table 5.
Table 5. Eight possible combinations of the three crisis scenarios with associated probability of occurrence
Event
Notation
Epidemic Terrorist Attack Internal Conflict Prob. Occurrence
None 8%
A 3 2%
B 3 8%
C 3 32%
AB 3 3 2%
AC 3 3 8%
BC 3 3 32%
ABC 3 3 3 8%
4.2. Network Design Changes
In addition to the demand changes resulting from crisis events, as described above,
we expand upon the base model by considering various reasonable supply chain al-
terations. We examined eight supply chain variants, incorporating additions such as:
capping the number of locations a transshipment node can support, increasing the
number of transshipment facilities, allowing flexibility in transshipment node place-
ment, and modifying the objective. The rationale behind these network variations was
to either validate the current network configuration or to recommend modifications
for the projected ASCNP to improve its robustness and service levels. However, since
the resulting robustness analysis considered a total of 64 combinations (i.e., the eight
supply chain model variants crossed with the eight combinations of crisis scenarios)
only the most informative subset of the analysis are included in this manuscript.
4.2.1. Transshipment Node Capacity Modification
In the original network, every transshipment facility location can support all locations.
However, in a real-world setting, such an uncapacitated approach is infeasible. To ad-
dress this issue we implemented a modification to ASCNP restricting each transship-
ment facility to a maximum number of locations they can support. Based on subject
matter expert feedback, we determine the maximum number of demand locations a
transshipment hub can support is C =26.
4.2.2. Base Model plus Three Additional Transshipment Nodes
The base network established seven locations as transshipment nodes. This model
variation, denoted Base plus Three, allows the setup of three additional transshipment
nodes and identies their locations. This could potentially increase the number of con-
nections between locations and transshipment nodes, leading to an improvement in
the network service level and a higher resilience. We incorporate this modification in
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our base model by replacing Constraint (5) with Constraint (14) which ensures that
a total of 10 transshipment nodes are selected.
∑
i∈I/1
xi = 10 (14)
4.2.3. Main Hub with Six Additional Transshipment Nodes
This model variation, denoted Hub with Six, allows almost complete flexibility in de-
termining the appropriate transshipment facility locations. The only specified trans-
shipment facility location is the hub the remaining six transshipment node locations
are selected by the model. This variation provides insight into whether the originally
specified locations are appropriate transshipment nodes. We introduce this variation
by replacing Constraint (11) of the base model with Constraint (15) in which the hub
is the only required transshipment node.
x22 = 1 (15)
4.2.4. Hub with Six Additional Transshipment Nodes and Zero Weight on
Connectivity
This model variant, Altered Objective, requires a transshipment node at the hub and
allows the model to determine six other transshipment locations (same as 4.2.3, how-
ever this model additionally alters the objective function. In previous variations, the
distance of shipments had a weight of w1=0.95, and the distance of additional con-
nections a weight of w2=0.05. For this variation, we set w1=1 and w2=0, meaning
that the distance of shipments is the sole objective, and the backup (non-shipping)
routes could be chosen arbitrarily. This variation aims to expose the cost such backup
connections (resilience) inflicts on the network. The altered objective variation shows
how resilience affects the optimal node and route selection within the model.
In the following section, we analyze these model variants in conjunction with the
most frequent demand scenarios, that is scenario C (internal conflict) and scenario BC
(terrorist attack and internal conflict).
4.3. Model Instances Output
4.3.1. Base Model Without Capacity Constraints
The base model requires the main hub along with six other locations to be trans-
shipment nodes. Table 6 shows the selected transshipment facilities, the number of
locations each facility supplied, and the selected mode of transportation.
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Table 6. Base Model number of connections and transportation mode
Node Transshipment Facility Location Number of Connections Transportation Mode
22 Main Hub 51
Air
and Sea
7 TF-1 4 Land
12 TF-2 1 Land
19 TF-3 1 Land
38 TF-4 1 Land
46 TF-5 1 Sea
58 TF-6 0 –
The main hub is the most used transshipment node in the ASCNP. It supplies 51
locations and leaves only eight other locations to be reached via another transshipment
node. This is primarily due to no available airports at those eight demand locations.
Therefore, it is more efficient to supply these locations by first flying their demand
to a transshipment node and then supplying them by land. Given that there is no
limit on the number of locations a transshipment node can supply, the most efficient
method in terms of distance is for the hub to ship directly to demand locations instead
of going through another transshipment node. For instance, the distance between TF-
1 (a transshipment facility location) and one end demand locations is shorter than
the distance between it and the hub. However, shipping through the TF-1 instead of
directly from the hub would increase the shipping distance by approximately 90 miles.
Sea transportation is utilized to ship material from the hub to five locations, each
which have seaports relatively near the hub. When available, sea transportation is the
most efficient means of transportation for locations less than 500 miles from the hub.
TF-1 is the second most utilized transshipment node, supplying four locations.
Three transshipment facilities ship to one location by land, while another supplies
one location by sea, leaving one current transshipment facility idle–as a transshipment
node. This node is such a large distance from the hub that it could be more suitable
as solely a demand location rather than as a transshipment node.
4.3.2. Base Model with Capacity Constraints
In this model instance, we add a capacity constraint to the base model by limiting
the number of locations a transshipment node can support to 26. This modified net-
work begins to reflect the hub and spoke design of the current network that relies on
transshipment facilities to reach lower demand end locations.
Table 7 shows the selected transshipment facility locations and the number of loca-
tions that each facility supplies.
Table 7. Base Model number of transshipment node connections with transshipment node connections con-
straint
Node Transshipment Facility Location Number of Connections
22 Main Hub 26
7 TF-1 12
46 TF-2 11
12 TF-3 4
19 TF-4 4
38 TF-5 2
58 TF-6 0
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Because of the capacity constraint, more transshipment nodes play a greater role
in the shipping distribution than in the base model. The hub still supplies the most
locations (reaching the maximum capacity of 26), but TF-1 and TF-2, being very
central in the network, ship to 12 and 11 locations, respectively. We note that TF-6 is
still not used as a distribution center but simply serves as a demand node. This could
indicate the unsuitability of TF-6 as a transshipment node.
4.3.3. Base Model with Three Additional Transshipment Nodes with Demand Change
In this analysis, we study the Base plus Three model under the different demand
scenarios described in the previous section. We analyze the demand scenarios for cases
of a network both with and without capacity on its transshipment nodes connections.
Table 8 summarizes the likelihood of opening each additional transshipment
node based on the realized demand scenarios when no capacity is imposed on the
network. The likelihoods were computed based on the probabilities computed in
Table 5. As the results show, TF-7 and TF-8 open regardless of the realized demand
scenario. As expected, the probability that the third location is established at TF-9
or TF-10 corresponds to the likelihood of the events (B, C, AC) and (None, A, AB,
BC, ABC), respectively.
Table 8. Base plus Three likelihood of transshipment node selection without transshipment node connections
constraint
Node Transshipment Facility Location Likelihood Scenarios
2 TF-7 100% All scenarios
42 TF-8 100% All scenarios
61 TF-9 51% {B, C, AC}
20 TF-10 49% {None, A, AB, BC, ABC}
When capacity is imposed on the network, the same additional transshipment fa-
cility locations are selected; however their likelihood changes, as summarized in Table
9. The transshipment facilities at TF-7 and TF-8 are still opened irrespective of the
demand scenario. The likelihood of using TF-9 as a transshipment node increases to
66%, and TF-10's likelihood drops to 34%.
Table 9. Base plus Three likelihood of transshipment node selection with transshipment node connections
constraint
Node Transshipment Facility Location Likelihood Scenarios
2 TF-7 100% All scenarios
42 TF-8 100% All scenarios
61 TF-9 66% {None, B, C, AC, ABC}
20 TF-10 34% {A, AB, BC}
4.3.4. Base plus Three with Internal Conflict
In this section, we solve the Base plus Three model with a network disruption due to
internal conflict (scenario C). We solve this model instance for cases of a network both
with and without the transshipment node connections constraint.
Table 10 summarizes the transshipment nodes selected as well as their number
of established connections for the case of the network instance without connectivity
constraints.
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Table 10. Base plus Three number of connections without transshipment node connections constraint
Node Transshipment Facility Location Number of Connections
22 Main Hub 29
2 TF-7 15
61 TF-9 6
7 TF-1 4
42 TF-8 2
12 TF-3 1
38 TF-5 1
46 TF-2 1
19 TF-4 0
58 TF-6 0
The opening of additional transshipment nodes reduces the number of locations
supported by the hub to 29. In fact, with the additional opening of seaport transship-
ment facilities at TF-9 and TF-7, the hub ships via sea to these locations, who then
supply farther locations and the transshipment nodes of TF-2, TF-3 and TF-5, now
each support one location. TF-4 and TF-6 do not supply any locations.
4.3.5. Main Hub with Six with Demand Change
In this model variant, the main hub is the only required transshipment node. We
analyze this model modification under the different demand scenarios without the
transshipment node connections constraint. Table 11 shows the selected transshipment
facility locations and their likelihood of being selected based on the realized demand
scenarios.
Table 11. Hub with Six likelihood of transshipment node selection without transshipment node connections
constraint
Node Transshipment Facility Location Likelihood Scenarios
2 TF-7 100% All
7 TF-1 100% All
20 TF-10 100% All
42 TF-8 100% All
61 TF-9 100% All
38 TF-5 82% {B, C, AB, AC, BC}
17 TF-11 18% {None, A, ABC}
In addition to the hub, transshipment nodes are always selected at five transship-
ment facilities, irrespective of the scenario. On the other hand, two locations are used
as a transshipment node 82% and 18% of the time, respectively. In comparison with the
selected transshipment nodes in the ASCN base model, we note that the only common
transshipment facility locations apart from the hub are TF-1 and TF-5. However, by
further inspection we notice that the other transshipment nodes are clustered around
those selected by the original decision makers, thus validating the network planners’
transshipment nodes’ placements. Though the exact locations are slightly different, we
find that the regions are grouped appropriately.
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5. Findings and Contributions
The AFSCN model selected transshipment nodes to reduce the shipping distance to
remote locations. The locations that only had one form of transportation (mainly
land) required a transshipment node between the hubs and the demand locations.
A transshipment facility used the shortest form of transportation initially to ship to
other transshipment nodes that then transported the items to the distant demand
location.
Establishing backup connections for resilience leads to solutions that use less
efficient routes. This has a cost, and when decisions are made to account for the
distances of backup connections to transshipment nodes, the model does not always
choose the shortest shipping distances the model solves for the shortest distance
overall.
The results of the different cases analyzed in the previous sections suggest the
following key findings. First, most of the current transshipment facility locations are
appropriately selected. The transshipment locations were chosen based on operational
requirements; the network was not modeled to to optimally select the locations.
The six additional transshipment nodes opened in the second variation of AFSCN
were either those chosen by the original network designers, or they were in the same
geographic area. Based on current and estimates of future demand, the supply chain
planners created a well-designed network.
Second, one transshipment facility location was never selected in any of the
model instances nor under any of the demand scenarios. This is due to its location
in the outermost part of the network, making it distant from most other locations.
This suggests that this location should not be used as a transshipment facility.
We recognize however that there are many reasons beyond optimal efficiency and
resilience that facility locations are chosen. For example, political or future network
design considerations are often taken into account. The value that our model provides
to decision makers is that it communicates that under no current or forecasted
requirements is the current design optimal.
Third, in addition to recommending where savings can be achieved by remov-
ing a transshipment facility, the results of the Base plus Three variant, demonstrate
which locations are most suitable for additional transshipment facilities should the
future need arise. Three additional locations are consistently suggested across the
different scenarios. With the current AFSCN infrastructure, our method provides
recommendations as to how the network should be contracted or expanded.
A main contribution of this paper is a method by which supply chain design-
ers and network planners can integrate risk assessments, local capabilities and
environmental factors into facility location decisions. We provide a risk analysis
framework that classifies levels of conflict, infrastructure capability and environmen-
tal risk. These factors are generalizable across any facility location problem and are
relevant to all supply chains. We then show how publicly available data sets–provided
by the US State Department and CIA Factbook, can be used to populate the risk
framework with location-specific assessments. The countries of West Africa and real
demand scenarios are used to demonstrate how these factors are taken into account to
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design an efficient network that is both resilient to disruption and robust to demand
changes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such effort to do this.
6. Conclusion and Future Research
This research study created a resilient, operational road map to allow a network
to function during disruptions. Our AFSCN model incorporates 60 West African
demand locations and uses transshipment nodes as originally determined by network
planners. To account for demand fluctuations due to disruption–terrorist attacks,
epidemics and/or natural disaster, multiple different scenario occurrences and their
likelihood were identified. We then analyzed the resulting network connections and
shipping ow.
The first model variation allowed three additional transshipment nodes should
they be required. The second variation of the model allowed the selection of any
six transshipment nodes in addition to the main hub, without requiring any specific
location to be a transshipment node. This variation answered whether the chosen
locations are efficient for a transshipment facility. The final variation of the model
modied the objective function by minimizing the distance of the shipping routes
without considering the backup connections distances to other warehouses. This
variant assessed the impact of backup connections on transshipment facility locations
and established routes.
Four main findings arose from our analysis. First, the transshipment locations
are accurately selected, as each of the transshipment nodes in the Base plus Three
and Hub with Six models were either close in proximity or the exact locations as
selected by the original network designers. One location not selected in any of the
model variants, no matter which demand scenario occurred. The fact that this facility
is situated in the outermost part of the network makes it unsuitable to be a transship-
ment node. Three additional transshipment facilities are identified as the most suitable
locations should the need arise. These locations are seaports along the coast of Ghana.
Finally, establishing backup connections for resilience leads to solutions that
use less efficient routes. In fact, when accounting for the distances of backup connec-
tions to transshipment nodes, the model does not always choose the shortest shipping
distance but solves for the shortest distance overall. Two key points emerge from this
insight. First, there is an efficiency cost to resilience. Modeling the network allows
us to determine that cost. Second, resilience must be considered at the supply chain
level and not the individual node level. As our AFSCN model demonstrates, the op-
timal system design may lead to sub-optimal solutions for individual nodes and routes.
This study opens several opportunities for future research. In the current model,
there is no cost imposed for creating a transshipment node or for the shipping
distance. The objective of the model could be altered to account for these financial
aspects, as they may play a role in the actual determination of transshipment
facility placement. Further, the number of items shipped by air, land, and sea is
unconstrained. However, in real-world situations, different locations have different
capacity and means available, e.g., air crew sizes, number of land/sea vehicles, etc.
A more realistic instance of this model would be to impose a limit on the quantity
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of material that can shipped by each mode. Finally, in this work, the demand
uncertainty is treated by individually assessing the network modification that occurs
following the realization of the demand scenario events with the highest likelihood. A
different approach would be to incorporate the demand randomness in the model and
solve for the resulting transshipment node placements, established routes and links,
and network flow quantities through stochastic or robust optimization. Undoubtedly,
such an approach would require significant nontrivial modifications to our model.
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